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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to test the exchange rate regime – growth nexus in transition economies 
by looking if and how some inherent characteristics of the transition process might have affected the 
de-facto classifications of exchange rate regimes. 28 transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are investigated over 1991-2007 and three de 
facto classifications of exchange rate regimes are considered. As usual in the empirical literature, 
initially, the exchange rate regime effect on growth differs across classifications. However, further 
investigation suggests that the three classifications usually disagree around some inherent 
characteristics of the transition process, like the higher trade openness of the countries, the episodes of 
high inflation and the bank system reform and interest rate liberalization. Results indicate that high 
inflation likely determined disagreement in early transition, while trade openness and interest rate 
liberalization in late transition. After classifications have been cleaned of the disagreeing points, the 
final results, corrected for the potential selectivity bias, suggest that both pegs and intermediate 
regimes of all three classifications significantly outperform floats in terms of economic growth, the 
average effect being slightly lower for pegs. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the onset of the general floating of the exchange rates across the world after Breton 
Woods system broke down, the interest in the exchange rate regimes increased. One strand of 
literature (e.g. Rizzo, 1998; Edwards, 1999) investigates how countries choose the exchange rate 
regime. Another strand (Mussa, 1986; Moreno, 2000 and 2001; Domac et al. 2001; Eichengreen and 
Leblang, 2003; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2004; Husain et al. 2005; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 
2005; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005; Harms and Kretschmann, 2009) analyses the macroeconomic 
implications of the chosen regime in operation. Among the latter are the studies investigating 
exchange rate regime effect on economic growth. However, their results are diverging: while ones 
find that a peg supports growth, others find negative or no relationship.  
As a consequence, researchers started questioning the exchange rate regime classification. 
However, while the earlier literature questioned the IMF de-jure classification (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2005), the latter literature (Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia, 2011) questions the merits of 
the de-facto classifications. The idea behind the questioning of the de-jure classification was that there 
is perhaps a gap between what countries officially report and what they actually do with regard to the 
exchange rate regime. This gave rise to the phenomenon of “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 
2002), when a country declares a float, but heavily intervenes to prevent large swings in the exchange 
rate to adversely affect the economy. Hence, any analysis based on the self-reported regimes would be 
unreliable.  
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) are the most prominent papers who devoted an effort to develop a de-facto 
classification of the exchange rate regimes that would reflect the reality and would give the analyses 
reliability. Though, it showed up that there is no consensus even when the analyses are based on the 
de-facto classifications only (Harms and Kretschmann, 2009). Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2011) 
document the extent to which the three de-facto classifications are different, suggesting that these 
differences then likely drive the different effects on growth. 
In addition to this, results with regard to the exchange rate regime effect on growth in the 
literature further differ when developing (transition) versus advanced economies are observed. 
Estimating the exchange rate regime effect on growth may be further complicated in transition 
economies, due to their inherent processes over transition, like the episodes of high inflation – which 
made some of those countries embark on a peg; and the episodes of currency pressures – which made 
them exit a peg. Moreover, the processes of capital-account liberalization, bank reform and interest 
rate liberalization, the opening up of the trade and foreign exchange system, reserves level and 
fluctuations, while affecting the speed and quality of the transition process, might have impinged on 
the de-facto exchange rate regime pursued in practice in these economies. Some of these issues have 
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not been analyzed in the literature underpinning the issue analyzed herein and hence will contribute to 
the current sparse of knowledge. 
The objective of this research is to empirically test the exchange rate regime – growth nexus 
in transition economies by examining if and how the potential disagreements among de-facto 
classifications have been governed by the inherent characteristics of the transition process. Transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States are analyzed 
over 1991-2007. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
literature regime-growth. Section 3 emphasizes the issue of classification of the exchange rate regime, 
with particular reference to the variety of de-facto classifications. Section 4 identifies some inherent 
characteristics of the transition process that might have affected the de facto exchange rate regime. 
Section 5 reviews the used model, methodology and data. Section 6 presents the results and offers a 
discussion. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of the literature 
Several studies diagnose if and how exchange rate regimes affect growth. These include: 
Moreno, (2000, 2001); Domac et al. (2001); Gosh et al. (2002); Bailliu et al. (2003); Eichengreen and 
Leblang (2003); Rogoff et al. (2003); De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003); Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005); Husain et al. (2005); Harms and Kretschmann (2009); 
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2011) and others. Advocates of pegs highlight that they promote 
environment conductive to trade, investment and, hence, growth by reduced policy uncertainty and 
lowered interest-rates variability. Gylfason (2000) explains that macroeconomic stability imposed by 
pegging promotes foreign trade, thus “stimulating economic efficiency and growth over the long haul 
and restraining inflation, which is also good for growth” (p.176). Fixing the exchange rate may enable 
faster growth in the medium and long run by supporting greater openness to international trade. Also, 
the latter may spur growth by easing technology transfer, thus aiding the productivity growth, and 
which in turn is boosted by promoting greater openness (Moreno, 2001).  
However, a flexible exchange rate may enable fast and easy accommodation and absorption 
of aggregate economic shocks (Bailliu et al. 2003). “When the adjustment to shocks is smoother, one 
would expect the growth to be higher, given that the economy is, on average, operating closer to 
capacity” (p.385). This could yet stimulate protectionist behavior, distorted price signals and therefore 
misallocation of resources in the economy (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005; Nilsson and 
Nilsson, 2000). However, the effect of the exchange rate regime channeled through productivity 
growth is unclear. Aghion et al. (2005) argue that an aggregate external shock, under a peg, transmits 
into real activity and causes a higher share of the firms to experience credit constraints, given the 
under-developed financial market and thus hamper growth. In countries with a developed financial 
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sector, on the other hand, the positive effects of a flexible exchange rate prevail. Since financial sector 
development is associated with income levels, Aghion et al. (2009) offer a compelling explanation 
why the growth effects of exchange rate flexibility differ across income groups. 
The empirical findings on the regime-growth link differ as much as the theoretical 
considerations. An extensive review of the empirical literature can be found in Petreski (2009). 
Empirical findings considerably differ even when developing are contrasted with developed 
economies. For instance, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Bleaney and Francisco (2007) 
find that peg slows growth in developing economies, while exerts no effect in advanced economies. 
Gosh et al. (2002) also find a slight superiority of pegs, but show that this result is not very robust, 
while Rogoff et al. (2003) conclude the opposite for an isolated group of advanced economies, but not 
for developing ones. Dubas et al. (2005) and Huang and Malhorta (2004) conclude that regime does 
not matter for growth in the advanced economies, but conversely find a positive effect of peg on 
growth in developing economies.  
There is a variety of explanations for the contradictory results of the recent literature: the 
different studies refer to different country samples and time intervals; they differ in their choice of 
control variables that are used to mitigate omitted-variable bias; they use different estimators; and the 
like. Concerning the classification methods of the exchange rate regime, it might be that the different 
approaches – the use of official de jure or observed de facto exchange rate regimes – may lead to 
different results. This is discussed next. 
 
3. Exchange rate regimes: ‘Deeds versus Words’  
Divergent results made researchers to start questioning the exchange rate regime 
classification. A strand of the literature probably led by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005) argued that countries usually behave differently in practice, with regard to 
the exchange rate regime, than compared to what they report as their official regime. This gave rise to 
the phenomenon of “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), when a country declares a float, but 
in fact heavily intervenes to prevent large swings in the exchange rate to adversely affect the 
economy. Hence, any analysis based on the self-reported regimes seemed unreliable. These two 
studies opted to develop a de facto classification of the exchange rate regimes that would reflect 
reality.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) – hereafter RR – divide their observations into those in which a 
country has a unified exchange rate versus dual or parallel rates. For countries with only official rates, 
they then use statistical methods to verify the accuracy of the de jure classification and/or place the 
observation into an alternative category, relying mainly on data on exchange rate variability, 
variability relative to officially-announced bands and observed inflation. For countries with dual and 
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parallel rates they do likewise on the basis of the market-determined rate. They end up with 14 fine 
classes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) – hereafter LYS – for their part, classify exchange rate 
regimes on the basis of the volatility of the nominal exchange rate, the variability of its rate of change 
and the volatility of international reserves. High volatility of the first two and low volatility of 
reserves suggests float in their classification and the opposite for a peg. When all three volatilities are 
considerable to high, LYS classify the regime as dirty float or crawling peg. Bubula, Otker-Robe and 
Anderson from the IMF (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2002) – hereafter BORA – complemented the IMF 
de jure classification with information from IMF country reports and related sources (“press reports, 
news articles, and other relevant papers") and developed a third set of de facto regime classification. 
They end up with 13 classes of exchange rate regimes. 
While the earlier literature questioned the IMF de-jure classification, the recent literature 
(Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia, 2011) questions the merits of the de-facto classifications. The three 
prominent classifications reviewed above are based on different information: RR on the exchange 
rate, parallel market and observed inflation; LYS on the volatilities of the exchange rate and reserves; 
BORA on judgment. Indeed, for developing economies, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) 
applying their classification found negative relation between peg and growth, while Huang and 
Malhorta (2004) applying the RR classification found a positive relation. However, Husain et al. 
(2005) found insignificant differences of how pegs and floats affect growth relying on the same RR 
classification. The latter is found by Bleaney and Francisco (2005) when BORA is applied. Other 
examples of divergent results in developing economies can be easily found in the literature. So, it 
showed up that there is no consensus even when the analyses are based on the de-facto classifications 
only (Harms and Kretschmann, 2009). Figure 1 looks at the growth performance for different 
exchange rate regimes and different de facto classifications for the transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. It only builds intuition and does 
not reveal causal relationships; however, it suggests that although pegs might have some precedence 
over intermediate and floating regimes in terms of growth, still facts are far from conclusive across 
the three classifications. 
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Figure 1 - Growth across regimes and classifications
LYS RR BORA
Source: De facto classifications; World Development Indicators  
Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2011) document the extent to which the three de-facto 
classifications are different, suggesting that it likely drives the different growth effects. Given all 
those differences, the question for transition economies is whether the differences in the de facto 
exchange rate regime classifications reflect some (different) characteristics of the transition process 
and hence result in a disagreement. We discuss this next. 
 
4. Exchange rate regimes in transition to a market-based economy 
The issue of the exchange rate regime gained importance in the economies leaving the 
central-planned system. Sachs (1996) argues that in most of transition economies the first years after 
leaving the planned system experienced large structural imbalances: repressed inflation, marked by 
extreme shortages in consumer and producer markets; large fiscal deficits, including an overhang of 
foreign debt; extreme currency inconvertibility, including a large black-market premium on the 
exchange rate; low levels of domestic competitiveness; and weak trade and financial linkages with 
market economies. So, the objective of the transition process in the monetary sphere was to free 
prices, stabilize the price level, liberalise trade, unify markets (in particular, the foreign exchange and 
money markets) and thus prices (exchange and interest rates) (Belke and Zenkic, 2007). However, the 
price liberalization that followed along the likely monetary financing of the large fiscal deficits 
sparked high inflation. Many of the transition economies – like the Visegrad and the Baltic countries - 
pegged their currencies to impose the credibility of the anchor currency in the domestic system, but 
others - for example, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine - adopted a float along a stringent anti-
inflationary program.  
In parallel, many transition economies faced the tremendous challenge of transforming their 
banking systems from passive residuals (i.e. the mono-banking system and administered prices) to a 
system with the task of increasing economic efficiency and with an active role in the macroeconomic 
transmission process and management (i.e. a two-tier banking system, indirect instruments of 
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monetary policy and so on). Bank system reform, privatization and capitalization marked the entire 
decade of the 1990s with heavy measures undertaken to liberalize interest rates; government were 
advised that undercapitalized banking sectors may exacerbate macroeconomic instability by engaging 
in large-scale foreign borrowing at the time of capital-market liberalization (Sachs, 1998). 
Nevertheless, some studies (e.g. Dean, 2003) highlight the characteristic of transition 
economies being caught in tensions between rapid change and inherited rigidity. Certain of these 
tensions can be relieved with embarking on a flexible exchange rate – official or only de facto. For 
example, a tension emanating from the conflict between opening up to international trade and the 
privatized or restructured economy, on the one hand, and rigid relative wages and prices, on the other. 
The need for frequent real exchange rate adjustment under these circumstances has been more readily 
met by nominal exchange rate flexibility than by price and wage changes under an exchange rate peg. 
Rapid capital inflows and money market liberalization after transition began to bear fruit have been 
another source of pressure that has been more readily relieved by nominal than by real exchange rate 
changes; and so on. This is also probably how these countries feared to float or peg and manifested 
exchange rate regime behavior different than what they officially declared. The opening up to 
international trade, the reform of the foreign exchange and bank system, the capital flows, the high 
inflation, pressures on the foreign exchange market, all might have been a source of such tensions. 
Hence, the objective to de facto classify the exchange rate regime in operation, has been jeopardized 
with those factors on the high. 
The preceding discussion is mirrored on Figures 2 to 5. The figures refer to the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. For the 
purpose of the figures, we calculated the average rate of disagreement among the three de facto 
classifications of exchange rate regimes across countries and years. In all figures, the rate of 
disagreements is shown in blue diamonds and it shows a U-pattern: disagreement is higher and 
declining in the 1990, but then again increases around mid-2000. It is potentially related to the 
characteristics of inflation identified above: the high inflation, the opening up to trade, the bank and 
capital-account developments and the external vulnerabilities. Figure 2 suggests that periods of high-
to-hyper inflation in the early 1990 may be associated with disagreement of how regime in operation 
will be classified in the three de facto classifications. This may be expected, as RR and BORA 
consider inflation developments in their classifications, but not LYS. However, inflation cannot 
obviously explain the rising disagreement later. Though, Figure 3 offers an explanation for this. While 
one may believe that the opening up to international trade and the industry restructuring that happened 
due to privatization over 1990s may have played some role for the exchange rate regimes 
classification, Figure 3 does not reveal any obvious correlation over 1990s, but some relation may be 
claimed over 2000s, when due to the favorable global economy, these countries achieved very high 
rates of trade openness. So, if trade openness causes higher disagreement across exchange rate 
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regimes in transition economies, then it could be the period before the 2007 economic crisis when 
these countries switched or started considering switches toward more flexible regimes. 
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Figure 2 - ERR disagreement and inflation
Inflation (%, lhs)
Disagreement among ERRs (1=full agreement, rhs)
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Figure 3 - ERR disagreement and trade
Trade openness (% of GDP, lhs)
Disagreement among ERRs (1=full agreement, rhs)
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Figure 4 - ERR disagreement and financial sector
M2 (% of GDP, lhs)
Disagreement among ERRs (1=full agreement, rhs)
Financial openness (1=no capital controls and forex fully 
liberalized, rhs)
Bank reform and interest rate liberalization (1=fully reformed 
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Figure 5 - ERR disagreement and forex market pressures
Exchange rate volatility (average growth, %, lhs)
Reserves volatility (average growth, %, lhs)
Source: World Development Indecators  (The World Bank); Transition Indicators(EBRD); De facto exchange rate regime classifications of LYS, 
RR and BORA
Note: Figures are simple averages accross countries.
 
Figure 4 lends some further support to the idea highlighted on Figure 3. While inflation is 
likely determining the disagreement over 1990s, while international trade opening-up over 2000s, 
then money supply shows likely correlation over the entire period. However, high money supply over 
1990 may be reflecting the heavy financing of the fiscal deficits with central bank lending, which was 
luckily pretty rapidly subdued (1993-94), while the steady rising trend of money since early 2000s 
may be reflecting the favorable environment conductive to capital flows across transition countries. 
Inter alia, high capital inflows witnessed by transition economies during the good economy before the 
crisis created pressures on the foreign exchange market, which may have caused the disagreement 
among the exchange rate classifications. However, Figure 4 is ambiguous as it suggests that financial 
closeness and the absence of bank reform and interest rates being non-market driven in the early 
transition, may be associated with higher disagreement, but that sufficiently liberalized capital 
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account and money market in late transition may also be associated with higher disagreement. Finally, 
Figure 5, expectedly, suggests that the strengthened volatilities on the foreign exchange market, as 
expressed by the exchange rate and reserves volatility, may have also been associated with higher 
disagreement among the three de facto classifications. 
These stylized facts lend some support to the issues raised in the literature that many 
developments inflicted by the transition process might have created conflicts for the government with 
regard to the operation of the exchange rate regime. In turn, this likely affected the different de facto 
exchange rate classifications to disagree around how to classify their actual behavior with regard to 
the exchange rate regime. In turn, the disagreement may be causing the divergent results in the 
literature of how the de facto regime potentially affects growth. This context of the exchange rate 
regimes has not been explored in the literature and hence is the contribution that this paper tries to 
make.  
 
5. Model, methodology, data 
5.1. Economic model and methodology 
In order to investigate the exchange rate regime effect on growth, we will design a standard 
growth regression, whereby GDP growth per capita is regressed on pre-determined and policy 
variables (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). To this standard setup, we add two exchange rate dummies, 
for fixed and intermediate exchange rate regime, the floating regime being the referent category: 
          (1) 
Where:  is GDP growth per capita in country i in period t;  is the initial GDP in 1990 
for each country, hence the coefficient  would reflect the conditional convergence;  is the 
government consumption as a share of GDP;  is the gross capital formation as a share of GDP; 
 is the growth of the terms of trade;  is the growth of population;  is the log of 
population as a measure of size;  is export plus import as a share of GDP;  and  
are dummy variables taking a value of 1 if the country’s exchange rate regime in the respective period 
is classified as fixed and intermediate, respectively;  is a country-specific error term;  is the 
idiosyncratic error which is assumed to be well behaved. Our main interest is the parameters  and 
. 
To have the exchange rate regime dummies appropriately defined, we need to ensure that the 
three classifications – LYS, RR and BORA – have the same groups of regimes. As usual in the 
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literature (e.g. Bleaney and Francisco, 2007), we propose a three-way classification of fixed, 
intermediate and floating regimes. Table 1 present the dividing lines: 
Table 1 – Collapsing the currency spectrum in three categories 
 LYS RR BORA 
F
ix
e
d
 
Fix No separate legal tender 
Pre-announced peg or currency board 
arrangement 
Pre-announced horizontal band narrower than 
or equal to +/-2% 
De facto peg 
Another currency as a legal tender 
Currency union 
Currency board 
Economic union/Monetary 
coordination agreement 
Conventional fixed peg to a single 
currency 
In
te
r
m
e
d
ia
te
 
Dirty float 
Crawling peg 
Pre-announced crawling peg 
Pre-announced crawling band narrower than 
or equal to +/-2% 
De facto crawling peg 
De facto crawling band narrower than or 
equal to +/-2% 
Pre-announced crawling band wider than or 
equal to +/-2% 
De facto crawling band narrower than or 
equal to +/-5% 
Moving band narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
Conventional fixed peg to a basket 
Pegged within horizontal banks 
Forward-looking crawling peg 
Forward-looking crawling band 
Backward-looking crawling peg 
Backward-looking crawling band 
Other tightly managed floating 
F
lo
a
ti
n
g
 Float Managed floating 
Freely floating 
 
Managed floating with no 
predetermined path for the ER 
Independent floating 
Source: Drafted by the author, based on the respective classifications. 
Notes: Reinhart and Rogoff de facto classification: 1980-2007. Freely falling category reclassified following 
Chronologies. Bubula, Otker-Robe and Anderson de facto classification: 1980-2007. Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger de facto classification: 1980-2004. 
 
As suggested by the growth literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) and the exchange rate 
regimes literature (Harms and Kretschmann, 2009), regression (1) is estimated by the usual FE or RE 
estimators, which assume regressors’ being exogenous with respect to growth. However, while some 
studies find that endogeneity does not necessarily bias the results in growth regressions (Barro and 
Lee, 1994), still one may argue that exchange rate regime choice is not independent of output 
performance, nor are the other regressors fully exogenous to growth. Therefore, we show the 
estimates of an IV estimation also – FE or RE.1 The choice between FE and RE in both cases is made 
through the standard Hausman test.  In addition and for comparison purposes, we will specify OLS 
regression also, which disregards the country heterogeneity (i.e. ignores  in [1]).  
                                                             
1 Closely related to the IV estimation, the annual GDP growth rates are often found to be persistent, which 
implies that growth regressions should include a lag of the GDP growth as an additional regressor, in which case 
a dynamic IV estimator would fit better. However, in all cases we documented an insignificant lagged growth, 
which rendered the dynamic specification inappropriate. 
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In the second step, we will identify the points where the three pairs of exchange rate regime 
classifications (Section 3) disagree. A disagreement occurs if one classification classifies observation j 
differently than the other classification. For the three pairs of classifications, we define three dummy 
variables which take a value of 1 where classifications X and Y disagree, and 0 otherwise. As the 
disagreeing dummies definition is an empirical matter, more details on this follow in the Results 
section. To investigate if the disagreement is determined by the inherent characteristics of the 
transition process, we will run the following model: 
      (2) 
Where:  is the dummy variable as defined before;  is the broad money to GDP 
ratio;  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the observation for inflation falls in the 
fourth quartile for the whole panel;   is similarly defined from a variable which sums the 
rates of growth of the nominal exchange rate and reserves, as indicators of the developments/pressures 
on the foreign exchange market;  is the trade openness, defined as export plus import to GDP; 
 is the financial openness indicator, taking a value of 1 if country i in period t has been classified 
as with no or little reformed trade and foreign exchange market;  is a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if country i in period t has been considered with little reformed bank system and 
money market;  is a country-specific error term;  is the idiosyncratic error which is assumed to 
be well behaved. The selection of variables in the regression (2) is led by the discussion and the 
underlying literature reviewed in Section 4. Regression (2) will be estimated with the standard panel 
probit model.  
In the final step, the findings from regression (2) will be used to identify and remove all 
observations of disagreement due to the transition process. The ‘cleaned’ exchange rate regimes will 
be then used to re-estimate regression (1) in order to check if the disagreement points cause unreliable 
estimation of the true effect of regimes on growth. However, the ‘cleaning’ may be non-random and 
impose selectivity bias onto the obtained coefficients through an FE/RE estimator. Sample selectivity 
bias occurs when the data availability is influenced by a selection process related to the value of the 
dependent variable. This selection process can introduce correlation between the error term and the 
regressor, which leads to bias in the OLS estimator. In our particular case, cleaning the disagreement 
points of the pairs of classifications may be related to growth. We will therefore utilize the Heckman 
(1979) two-step procedure for potential correction of this bias. The Heckman approach is documented 
in any standard econometric book, e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon (1999, pp.480). Hence, we will 
empirically reveal if such selectivity bias exists in our case and if so, results will be corrected for.  
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5.2. Data 
The models set in the previous section will be estimated for 28 transition economies from 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
2
. The referent period is 
1991-2007. The termination of the dataset in 2007 is determined by the availability of the data from 
the three de facto classifications. The data for the exchange rate regimes are obtained from the web 
sites of Levy-Yeyati (LYS), Carmen Reinhart (RR), and from Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) and the 
IMF web site for BORA. The main source of the data for the other variables is the World 
Development Indicators. The indices on bank reform and interest-rate liberalization and trade and 
foreign exchange market reform have been taken from the Transition Indicators of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. The political stability indicator has been obtained from the 
World Governance Indicators. The financial crisis variable is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008).  
Appendix 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the analyzed variables as well their definitions and 
sources. 
 
6. Results and discussion 
6.1. Exchange rate regimes effect on growth  
Results of the model (1) are given in Table 2. Columns (1)-(4) give the estimates when the 
individual heterogeneity is not considered, while (5)-(8) when it is. Columns (9)-(13) present the 
estimates when potential regressors’ endogeneity is taken into account. Counting for the individual 
heterogeneity brings changes only in the investment rates: they probably capture countries’ 
differences in columns (1)-(4), so that when these are taken into account, their significance vanishes. 
Counting for potential endogeneity in the growth regression, in addition, only strengthens the 
crowding out effect implied by the significant and negative coefficient of the government 
consumption; and in some specifications reveals a positive effect of terms of trade change on growth; 
while all other coefficient largely retain their magnitude and significance. Columns (1), (5) and (9) 
give the estimates when the exchange rate regime dummies are not included while the subsequent 
columns present the estimates with the LYS, RR and BORA classifications, respectively. In terms of 
the standard determinants of growth, results are quite satisfactory and some of them show 
considerable robustness across specifications. However, when it comes to adding the exchange rate 
dummies in the regression, there are some notable differences.  
                                                             
2 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. 
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Firstly, exchange rate regimes matter for growth only when the RR classification is 
considered. According to it, a peg results in a better growth by about 1.7 to 3.4 percentage points as 
compared to a floating regime, while an intermediate regime on average performs slightly worse – it 
improves growth by 2.2 to 3.1 percentage points, as compared to a float. However, in the LYS and 
BORA specifications, regimes are unimportant for growth. Notably though, the inclusion of LYS-
classification dummies in the basic specification brings some changes: inflation becomes statistically 
significant with the expected negative sign. On the other hand, the BORA-classification dummies do 
not make any changes. Therefore, the question is to what extent differences in the exchange rate 
regimes classifications (Section 3) drive those results. 
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Table 2 – Exchange rate regime effect on growth 
 Individual heterogeneity not considered Individual heterogeneity considered Potential endogeneity considered 
 Without 
ERR 
LYS RR BORA Without 
ERR 
LYS RR BORA Without 
ERR 
LYS RR BORA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GDP in 1990 -1.381 -2.010** -1.172 -1.419 -1.334 -1.317 -1.149 -1.409 -1.334 -1.317 -2.657 -1.409 
Government 
consumption to 
GDP 
-0.319*** -0.318*** -0.384*** -0.333*** -0.291* -0.394** -0.323** -0.294* -1.215*** -0.559* -1.352* -1.134*** 
Investment to 
GDP 
0.216*** 0.059 0.219*** 0.229*** 0.137 0.034 0.139 0.134 -0.384 -0.076 -0.472 -0.634 
Inflation 0.003 -0.062* 0.002 0.007 -0.008 -0.083** 0.034 -0.009 -0.105 -0.098* -0.463 -0.133 
Terms of trade 
growth 
0.023 0.040 -0.012 -0.021 -0.021 -0.032 -0.030 -0.020 0.161* 0.010 0.139 0.191* 
Population 
growth 
-0.682 -2.040*** -1.189* -0.291 -0.252 -1.054* -0.560 -0.051 0.268 -1.379 -0.879 -0.653 
Population size 0.593 0.473 0.665 0.681 0.707 0.884* 0.654 0.762 -0.365 0.859 1.203 0.296 
Trade to GDP 0.025* 0.040*** 0.011 0.023 0.032** 0.058** 0.021 0.032** 0.114** 0.089* 0.084 0.109** 
Regimes 
Fixed regime - 0.607 2.549* 1.286 - -0.135 1.736** 0.691 - -0.315 3.358* -0.204 
Intermediate 
regime 
- 1.064 3.099*** 0.584 - 0.228 2.186*** 0.458 - 0.316 2.516** 0.982 
 
Fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman test 
Ho: FE preferred 
- - - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0022 
Hansen test 
Ho: Instruments 
are valid 
- - - - - - - - 0.7459 0.6517 0.5372 0.8588 
Observations 154 81 150 154 154 81 150 154 147 76 145 147 
R2 0.2314 0.4573 0.2668 0.2382 0.2149 0.3918 0.2515 0.2174 0.0817 0.3369 0.0905 0.0881 
F-stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 0.0132 0.0019 0.0019 0.0205 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Constant not reported. For the IV estimation, lags of the potentially endogenous 
variables have been used to correct potential endogeneity. 
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6.2. Exchange rate regimes: ‘Words understood differently’ 
Table 3 presents the extent of disagreement between pairs of the three classifications. 
Matches are given in the diagonal of each contingency sub-table. In the three sub-tables, the degree of 
matching does not exceed 59%, which is not surprising, given classifications use different inputs in 
the algorithms (Section 3). Three stylized facts emerge from Table 3 (grey cells): 
(1) RR is likely in favor of intermediate regimes when compared to LYS (42% of LYS pegs and 
41% of LYS floats are classified as intermediates in RR); 
(2) BORA is likely in favor of intermediate regimes when compared to LYS (37% of LYS pegs 
and 41% of LYS floats are classified as intermediates in BORA) and is more flexible than 
LYS (41% of LYS intermediates are classified as floats in BORA); 
(3) BORA is likely a mirror of RR with regard to intermediates and floats (44% of RR floats are 
classified as intermediates in BORA and 73% of BORA floats are classified as intermediates 
in RR). 
Table 3 – Disagreement between regime classifications 
 
RR 
 
 
BORA 
 
 
BORA   
fix int fl TOT fix int fl TOT fix int fl  TOT 
L
Y
S
 fix 41 35 6 82 
L
Y
S
 fix 43 32 11 86 
R
R
 
fix 61 9 1 71 
int 2 35 4 41 int 5 33 26 64 int 12 57 87 156 
fl 4 25 32 61 fl 5 34 45 84 fl 0 24 30 54 
   TOT 47 95 42 184    TOT 53 99 82 234    TOT 73 90 118 281 
Matching 58.7% Matching 51.7% Matching 52.7% 
Source: Drafted by the author, based on data from the respective classifications. 
 
In turn, we will investigate the disagreement of Table 3 by shedding light on the transition process. As 
argued in section 4, several processes have been occurring in transition economies, especially over 
1990s. Some of them interfered with the exchange rate regime in operation, i.e. forced countries to 
“behave” in certain way with regard to the exchange rate regime, which may be the source of 
disagreement between regime classifications. To investigate this, we will create three ‘disagreement’ 
dummies so as each reflects one of the three stylized facts inferred from Table 3, as follows: 
(1) LYS-RR disagreement dummy, taking a value of 1 if fixed or float in LYS and intermediate 
in RR, 0 otherwise; 
(2) LYS-BORA disagreement dummy, taking a value of 1 if fix or float in LYS and intermediate 
in BORA or if intermediate in LYS and float in BORA, 0 otherwise; 
(3) RR-BORA disagreement dummy, taking a value of 1 if intermediate in RR and float in 
BORA or if intermediate in BORA and float in RR, 0 otherwise. 
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Then, we use the discussion in Section 4 and the empirical probit model (2) of Section 5.1 to check if 
some transition characteristics may be describing regime-classification differences. Table 4 gives the 
results. 
Table 4 – Testing the disagreement between regime classifications 
 LYS-RR LYS-BORA RR-BORA 
(1) (2) (3) 
M2 to GDP 0.0002 0.0009 0.002 
High inflation -0.064 0.219*** 0.120* 
High exchange market pressure -0.039 -0.071 -0.017 
Trade openness 0.004** -0.003 -0.0003 
Financial openness -0.156 -0.113 -0.101 
Banks reform and interest rate liberalization  -0.050 -0.035 -0.146* 
 
Observations 198 223 264 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 4 offers interesting insights into what might determine the disagreement between pairs 
of regime classifications. Column (1) refers to the LYS-RR pair. It suggests that greater trade 
openness increases the possibility that the two classifications will result in disagreement around how 
to classify regimes. The disagreement likely results in some de-facto intermediate regimes being 
classified by either pegs or floats by LYS or vice versa by RR. This is not strange, given that LYS 
relies on the volatility of the exchange rate and reserves, while RR on the existence of dual exchange 
markets. So, the more a country is open to trade, the higher the probability that LYS will classify on 
the corners, probably because openness causes higher volatility of the exchange rate and/or reserves 
than in less open economy. This finding can be reconciled with the reality, as this disagreement likely 
happened in the late transition (over 2000s) when the capital inflows in those countries were on the 
high. Many countries in this period started rethinking their exchange rate policies and all development 
result in a disagreement between LYS and RR.  
Column (2) refers to the LYS-BORA pair, suggesting that these two classifications do not 
agree around episodes of high inflation in transition economies. Recall that high inflation herein is 
defined as any period when inflation fell into the fourth quartile of the entire sample. This is again not 
strange, given that LYS do not consider inflation in their classification directly, while BORA account 
for it. High inflation episodes then lead BORA to classify more regimes as intermediates or floating. 
This disagreement, contrary to the previous one, likely refers to the early transition, when inflation 
was on the spike in many transition countries. 
That BORA puts emphasis on inflation role for the de-facto regime in operation is justified 
when compared to RR in column (3). This characteristic of BORA is again emphasized here, because 
inflation is not considered directly even in the RR case. As in the previous case, this disagreement 
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between RR and BORA likely emanates from the early transition. In addition, the more the interest 
rate has been liberalized and bank system reformed, the more RR and BORA disagree on the regime 
classification. This is also intuitive, as RR did not account for any characteristic on the money market, 
while BORA likely accounted it for through observing country reports. However, this disagreement 
likely emanates from the late transition when money markets became almost perfectly liberalized 
hence sending signals which were differently understood by the three classifications. 
These identified differences due to the early or later transition process may be driving the 
different results for the exchange rate regime effect on growth in transition economies, as identified in 
Table 2. To eliminate the points of disagreement, we will adjust the classifications by eliminating 
potentially conflicting points, as suggested by the findings in Table 4. Specifically, we will eliminate: 
i) the observations where RR disagrees with LYS and where trade openness is classified as high; ii) 
the observations where BORA disagrees with LYS and where inflation is classified as high; and iii) 
the observations where RR disagrees with BORA and where inflation is classified as high or interest 
rates as sufficiently or highly liberalized. After doing so, the level of matching between the pairs of 
regimes becomes considerably higher than before. This is shown in Table 5, which suggests that the 
off-diagonal elements as suggested to be the disagreement points according to the investigation in 
Table 4, are now indeed very low. 
Table 5 – Matching and disagreement between regime classifications after transition influence 
accounted for 
 
RR 
 
 
BORA 
 
 
BORA   
fix int fl TOT fix int fl TOT fix int fl  TOT 
L
Y
S
 fix 41 1 0 42 
L
Y
S
 fix 40 1 1 42 
R
R
 
fix 42 5 0 47 
int 2 29 2 33 int 2 29 2 33 int 3 15 12 30 
fl 2 0 25 27 fl 2 0 25 27 fl 0 2 25 27 
   TOT 45 30 27 102    TOT 44 30 28 102    TOT 45 22 37 104 
Matching 93.1% Matching 92.2% Matching 78.8% 
Source: Drafted by the author, based on data from the respective classifications. 
 
This confirms that transition characteristics in the investigated economies, mainly: their trade 
openness, high inflation episodes and the process of reforming of the bank system and liberalization 
of the money market were the reasons for disagreement around the classification of the exchange rate 
regimes. 
 
6.3. Clean exchange rate regimes effect on growth  
To fully verify the finding of Section 6.2, Table 6 gives the results of the exchange rate 
regime effect on growth when the cleaned regimes are considered, i.e. after the three classifications 
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have been reconciled. Note that we now use the Heckman two-step selection method so as to 
comprehend the potential presence of the selectivity bias, i.e. the probability that classifications’ 
cleaning has been non-random. The primary equation is the growth model we estimated in Table 2 
(with ‘cleaned’ exchange-rate regime classifications), while the selection equation includes the 
explanatory variables in Table 4, i.e. the transition factors. Toward the bottom of the table, we report 
the inverse mills ratio, which in all three cases is statistically insignificant. This suggests that the error 
terms in the selection and the primary equations are not correlated, so that (transition) factors that 
increase the probability of disagreement between the pairs of regime classifications, tend to be 
unrelated to growth. In other words, we do not find support that classifications’ cleaning has resulted 
in a non-random sample. 
The standard growth determinants largely retained their magnitude and significance, hence 
serving as robustness check for the earlier results. However, after classifications have been cleaned 
for the conflicting points, discrepancies around the effect they reveal on growth now vanish. All three 
classifications result in significant exchange rate regimes’ effect on growth.  
Table 6 – Exchange rate regime effect on growth, after classifications reconciled 
 LYS RR BORA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDP in 1990 -0.752 -1.073 -1.947 
Government consumption to GDP -0.714*** -0.625*** -0.575*** 
Investment to GDP 0.178 0.303** 0.008 
Inflation -0.260* -0.103 -0.317* 
Terms of trade growth -0.077 0.094 0.104 
Population growth -0.942 -1.594** -2.192** 
Population size 1.310* 0.935* 0.872 
Trade to GDP 0.057** 0.035 0.056**** 
Constant -8.830 -1.305 12.975 
Regimes  
Fixed regime 3.568* 3.090** 2.136* 
Intermediate regime 2.588** 3.753*** 3.999* 
 
Selection equation  
M2 to GDP 0.009 0.012 -0.008 
High inflation -0.389 -2.164*** -0.585 
High exchange market pressure -0.133 -0.224 -0.776 
Trade openness 0.005* 0.003 0.006 
Financial openness -1.310*** -1.204*** -1.799** 
Banks reform and interest rate liberalization  -0.451* -1.694*** -1.301** 
Constant  -0.016 0.947 1.742 
 
Inverse mills ratio (lambda) 
Selection bias (p-value in parenthesis) 
2.573 
(0.298) 
0.489 
(0.676) 
3.864 
(0.144) 
 
Observations 168 171 71 
F-stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  
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Coefficients suggest that both pegs and intermediate regimes exert positive effect on growth in 
transition economies when compared to floats. Pegs are associated with on average 2 to 3.6 
percentage points higher growth when compared to floats. Intermediate regimes are associated with 
on average 2.6 to 4 percentage points higher growth when compared to floats.  
Table 7 – Testing coefficients equality between pairs of classifications 
 Fixed regime 
coefficients 
Intermediate 
regime coefficients 
 Ho: No statistical difference 
LYS-RR 0.4503 0.1945 
LYS-BORA 0.5878 0.4804 
RR-BORA 0.1058 0.4725 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Table 7 further suggests that the differences between the pairs of regimes with regard to the regimes’ 
effect on growth are not statistically significant, which gives further support to the finding that once 
transition factors have been accounted for, classifications can be reconciled for transition economies 
to give harmonized picture for exchange rate regime effect on growth. 
Overall, the analysis suggests that in transition economies, the points of disagreements among 
the three de facto classifications of the exchange rate regimes can be explained by their different 
consideration of the trade openness of the economy, episodes of high inflation and the process of bank 
reform and interest rate liberalization. However, while high inflation episodes determined 
disagreement in the early transition, the international trade opening up and the liberalization of the 
money market only influenced disagreement in the later transition when the good global economy 
resulted with strong export and capital inflows in transition economies. These factors created different 
views on the de facto behavior of the exchange rate regime in operation. Once these conflicting points 
have been removed, results suggest that pegs and intermediate regimes affect economic growth 
positively in transition economies as compared to floats, the effect of intermediate regimes being on 
average slightly stronger than that of pegs. 
 
6.4. Some robustness checks 
To verify the robustness of our results obtained in Table 6, we will conduct some robustness 
checks, in the following lines: 
- Cut the first five years of the sample, due to the argument that these early-transition years 
were turbulent in transition economies, both in terms of economic developments (high 
inflation, privatization, large output declines due to civil unrest) and political developments 
(military conflicts, civil unrest); 
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- Addition of a variable approximating institutional quality, given that some works (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004) argue it should be included as a standard growth regressor. This variable 
is approximated by the political stability index from the World Governance Indicators. Note 
that the index starts from 1996. Besides institutional quality, this variable should capture the 
civil unrest which used to be a characteristic of the early transition period for some of the 
countries analyzed; 
- Excluding periods of financial crisis (banking and currency crisis) that might have impinged 
on the exchange-rate regime in operation and are related to output declines, as constructed 
from Laeven and Valencia (2008). Note that adding a dummy variable for financial crisis was 
not possible due to the low number of periods in such condition – only 3.8% in our sample. 
Results presented in Table 7 remain robust to the robustness checks. Regimes’ effect has not been 
influenced neither by the early developments in transition economies, nor by the political/institutional 
stability, nor by the occurrence of banking/currency crises. Political stability variable gains some 
significance in the specifications and suggests that going from the first to the third quartile of the 
distribution of the variable would result, on average, with 1.6 to 1.9 percentage points of additional 
growth. 
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Table 7 – Three types of robustness checks 
 Cutting the sample to 1996-2007 Addition of the institutional quality Excluding observations with financial 
crisis 
 LYS RR BORA LYS RR BORA LYS RR BORA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GDP in 1990 -0.184 -1.063 -2.117* -0.966 -1.584 -2.109 -0.530 -0.925 -1.946 
Government consumption to GDP -0.772*** -0.627*** -0.584*** -0.742*** -0.667*** -0.647*** -0.750*** -0.634*** -0.575*** 
Investment to GDP 0.146 0.303** 0.011 0.189 0.283** 0.017 0.172 0.307*** 0.007 
Inflation -0.264* -0.108 -0.200* -0.245* -0.004 -0.280 -0.288** -0.164 -0.317* 
Terms of trade growth -0.074 0.094 0.099 -0.045 0.152** 0.116 -0.076 0.093 0.104 
Population growth -0.886 -1.600** -2.258*** -0.588 -0.988 -1.506** -0.864** -1.653** -2.193** 
Population size 1.312 0.940 0.683 1.256* 0.539 0.895 1.382* 1.025* 0.872 
Trade to GDP 0.047* 0.035 0.050* 0.049* 0.006 0.044 0.057** 0.035 0.056* 
Institutional quality - - - 0.704 1.628** 1.325* - - - 
Constant -13.682 -1.446 17.971 -5.232 13.108 16.012 -11.784 -4.082 12.951 
Regimes    
Fixed regime 3.948* 3.104** 2.046 3.935* 3.619** 2.823 3.817* 3.314** 2.138* 
Intermediate regime 2.624* 3.762*** 3.826** 2.463** 3.923*** 3.363* 2.631** 3.889*** 4.002* 
   
Selection equation    
M2 to GDP 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.0102 -0.008 0.007 0.010  -0.008 
High inflation 0.159 -1.921*** -0.245 -0.389 -2.164*** -0.555 -0.397 -2.236*** -0.578 
High exchange market pressure -0.080 -0.199 -0.757 -0.133 -0.224 -0.776 -0.097 0.034 -0.773 
Trade openness -0.005 0.002 0.012 -0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.006 
Financial openness -1.361** -1.039** -1.345 -1.310*** -1.204*** -1.799** -1.326*** -1.386*** -1.794** 
Banks reform and interest rate 
liberalization  
-0.329 -1.570*** -1.207** -0.451 -1.694*** -1.301** -0.416 -1.574*** -1.301** 
Constant  0.291 1.160 0.881 -0.016 0.947 1.742 0.039 0.981 1.743 
 
Inverse mills ratio (lambda) 
Selection bias (p-value in parenthesis) 
5.152 
(0.162) 
0.628 
(0.652) 
2.526 
(0.236) 
2.718 
(0.268) 
0.267 
(0.812) 
4.458 
(0.149) 
3.279 
(0.201) 
1.040 
(0.381) 
3.879 
(0.145) 
 
Observations 114 108 65 168 171 71 157 150 70 
F-stat 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
Note: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Reported estimates of Heckman two-step procedure. 
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7. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to test the exchange rate regime – growth nexus in transition 
economies by looking at the de-facto classifications of exchange rate regimes and the inherent 
characteristics of the transition process. 28 transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States are investigated over 1991-2007 and three de facto 
classifications of exchange rate regimes are considered: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) 
classification based on the volatilities of the exchange rate and reserves; Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) 
classification based on information about the black foreign exchange market and inflation; and 
Bubula, Otker-Robe and Anderson’s (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2002) classification based on the 
official IMF classification and expert judgment, i.e. a variety of inputs.  
First, we added the exchange rate dummies in a standard growth regression a-la Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004). As usual in the empirical literature (e.g. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005; 
Huang and Malhorta, 2004; Husain et al. 2005), the initial finding for the exchange rate regime effect 
on growth in transition economies differs across classifications. We argued that classifications may be 
reflecting the different characteristics of the transition process differently, including but not limited to: 
high inflation, the volatility of the foreign exchange market, the processes of bank reform, foreign 
exchange market reform, interest rate liberalization, opening up to international trade and so on. 
Hence, in the second step, we detected the points of disagreement between the three pairs of exchange 
rate regime classifications and, accordingly, created three dummy variables to check if the transition 
characteristics have an explanatory power over the disagreements. Results suggest that the three 
classifications usually disagree around the higher trade openness of the countries, the episodes of high 
inflation and the bank system reform and interest rate liberalization. However, high inflation episodes 
determined disagreement in the early transition, while trade openness and interest rate liberalization in 
late transition. After classifications have been cleaned of the disagreeing points, the final results, 
corrected for the potential selectivity bias, suggest that both pegs and intermediate regimes of all three 
classifications significantly outperform floats in terms of economic growth, the average effect being 
slightly lower for pegs. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A.1 – Definitions and sources 
Definition Source Further note 
GDP per capita growth World Development Indicators  
GDP in 1990 World Development Indicators  
Government consumption to 
GDP 
World Development Indicators  
Investment to GDP World Development Indicators  
Inflation World Development Indicators  
Terms of trade growth World Development Indicators  
Population growth World Development Indicators  
Log of Population size World Development Indicators  
Trade to GDP World Development Indicators  
M2 to GDP World Development Indicators  
High inflation Calculated based on data from the 
World Development Indicators 
Taking a value of 1 if belonging to the 
fourth quartile in the distribution of the 
entire series 
High exchange market 
pressure 
Calculated based on data from the 
World Development Indicators 
Sum of the rates of growth of the 
nominal exchange rate and reserves 
Trade openness World Development Indicators Export plus import to GDP 
Financial openness Transition indicators – European 
Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
Taking a value of 1 if the country in 
certain period has been classified as 
with no or little reformed trade and 
foreign exchange market 
Banks reform and interest rate 
liberalization  
Transition indicators – European 
Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
Taking a value of 1 if the country in 
certain period has been considered with 
little reformed bank system and money 
market 
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Table A.2 - Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean St. dev. 
First 
quartile 
Third 
quartile Min Max Obs 
GDP per capita growth 2.24 10.47 -0.72 7.42 -45.33 90.47 460 
Log of GDP in 1990 8.86 0.60 8.43 9.43 7.60 9.71 425 
Government consumption to GDP 17.54 4.78 13.81 20.78 5.69 30.12 444 
Investment to GDP 23.96 7.94 19.40 28.09 -0.69 59.77 449 
Inflation 92.18 413.14 4.03 24.98 -8.53 4,734.9 355 
Terms of trade growth 2.04 7.31 -1.35 3.01 -20.96 43.86 182 
Population growth -0.04 1.13 -0.50 0.49 -6.68 3.73 476 
Log of Population size 15.69 1.13 15.03 16.15 13.33 18.82 476 
Trade to GDP 97.04 32.34 71.96 118.88 22.23 199.68 453 
M2 to GDP 29.73 16.96 14.74 42.41 4.83 73.56 362 
High inflation 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 476 
Political stability -0.13       0.79       -0.67 0.53 -2.24 1.2 335 
Financial crisis 0.04       0.19 0 0 0 1 476 
High exchange market pressure 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 476 
Trade openness 97.04 32.34 71.96 118.88 22.23 199.68 453 
Financial openness 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 459 
Banks reform and interest rate 
liberalization  0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 459 
 
 
